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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 
 We are asked to decide if the Pennsylvania Department of 
Public Welfare (“DPW")2 is violating Title II of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (the “ADA” or the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 
                     
 
    1 The United States Department of Justice has filed an 
Amicus Brief. 42 U.S.C. §12133 charges the Department with 
enforcement of Title II of the ADA.  Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
12134(a) and 42 U.S.C. 12206(c)(3), the Department has issued 
regulations and a Technical Assistance Manual interpreting Title 
II.  See 28 C.F.R. part 35 (1993); The Americans with 
Disabilities Act Title II Technical Assistance Manual (1993). 
     
2Although Karen F. Snider is the named defendant in this 
lawsuit, she was sued in her capacity as the Secretary of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.  We will, therefore, 
refer to the defendant as the Department of Public Welfare 
("DPW"), rather than Snider. 
  
12132, by the manner in which it operates its attendant care and 
nursing home programs.  Idell S. alleges that DPW is violating 
the ADA by requiring that she receive required care services in 
the segregated setting of a nursing home rather than through 
DPW's attendant care program.  That program would allow her to 
receive those services in her own home where she could reside 
with her children.  The district court ruled that DPW is not 
violating the ADA because it is not discriminating against Idell 
S.  For the reasons that follow we will reverse.  
 
 
 I. 
 
 
 In January of 1994, Idell S. filed an uncontested motion to 
join a lawsuit which had previously been filed by Beverly D., and 
Ilene F., who were also nursing home residents.3 The suit alleged 
                     
     
3
 Helen L., the original plaintiff in this law suit, was a 
patient at Norristown State Hospital when her suit was filed.  
She asserted a constitutional claim against Albert DiDario (the 
Superintendent of that facility) for alleged violations of her 
Fourteenth Amendment rights for failing to place her in an 
appropriate community setting and for unnecessarily maintaining 
her in Norristown State Hospital.  Although she alleged a claim 
under the ADA, she has since been discharged from Norristown 
State Hospital and thereafter pursed only a claim for damages for 
the alleged violation of her constitutional rights.  Memorandum 
Opinion, at 15-6.   
 In November of 1992, Beverly D. and Ilene F., joined Helen 
L.'s law suit and an Amended Complaint was filed asserting a 
claim on their behalf against Karen F. Snider, as the Secretary 
of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare.  In April of 
1993, they filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on their 
ADA claim.  After the parties agreed to a Stipulation of Facts, 
the motion for preliminary injunction was converted to one for 
  
that DPW had violated Title II of the ADA by providing services 
in a nursing home rather than in the “most integrated setting 
appropriate" to the plaintiffs' needs, and sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief. 
    Thereafter, Beverly D. and Ilene F. filed for an uncontested 
voluntary dismissal of their claim because they had been 
discharged from the nursing home. At the same time, Idell S. 
moved for summary judgment based upon an Amended Stipulation of 
Facts.  Prior to ruling on the joinder and voluntary dismissal 
motions, the district court issued a Memorandum and Order dated 
January 27, 1994, granting summary judgment against Beverly D. 
and Ilene F. and in favor of DPW.  On February 2, 1994, the 
district court issued an Order dismissing Beverly D. and Eileen 
F. as plaintiffs and adding Idell S. as a plaintiff.  The court 
also ruled that “[f]or the reasons stated in the Memorandum filed 
January 27, 1994, the motion for summary judgment of Idell S. is 
denied and judgment is entered in favor of defendants and against 
. . . Idell S. . . . ."  
 Idell S. then filed this appeal.4  
                                                                  
summary judgment, and DPW filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment. 
     
4
 In the same Memorandum and Order which denied Idell S.’s 
motion for summary judgment, the district court denied a motion 
for summary judgment filed by DiDario and DiDario appealed.  
DiDario’s appeal did not involve any questions of law or fact in 
common with Idell S.’s appeal.  On May 13, 1994, we entered an 
Order dismissing DiDario’s appeal for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction because the district court Order appealed from was 
not a final order. 
  
 II. 
 Idell S. is 43 years old and the mother of two children ages 
22 and 14.5  In 1973 she contracted meningitis which left her 
paralyzed from the waist down and greatly reduced her ability to 
care for herself.  As a result, she has been a patient at the 
Philadelphia Nursing Home since December 26, 1989.  Idell S. uses 
a wheelchair for locomotion and requires assistance with certain 
activities of daily living including bathing, laundry, shopping, 
getting in and out of bed, and house cleaning.  She is able to 
cook, dress herself (except for her shoes and socks), attend to 
her personal hygiene (using a transfer board to access the 
toilet) and to her grooming.  The parties agree that, although 
Idell S. is not capable of fully independent living, she is not 
so incapacitated that she needs the custodial care of a nursing 
home.   
                                                                  
 Following the issuance of the February 2, 1994 Order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Snider and against Idell 
S., the district court issued a Rule 54(b) Certification and 
Order on February 8, 1994, directing the Clerk to enter final 
judgment in favor of defendant Snider against Idell S.  Because 
Idell S.’s sole claim was disposed of, the certification creates 
a final judgment subject to appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291. 
See, Tilden Financial Corp. v. Palo Tire Service, 596 F.2d 604, 
607 (3d Cir. 1979).   
 Plaintiffs Florence H. and ADAPT were not parties to the 
summary judgment motions in the district court.  ADAPT’s motion 
for voluntary dismissal was granted by the district court on 
February 18, 1994.  
     
5The essential facts surrounding this controversy are not in 
dispute.  They are contained in an Amended Stipulation of Facts 
submitted to the district court in January of 1994. 
  
 DPW operates two different programs that provide physically 
disabled persons with assistance in daily living.  DPW funds 
nursing home residence through the Medical Assistance program 
(“Medicaid”), and it operates an “attendant care program” under 
62 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3051-3055 (the “Care Act”).  The 
attendant care program provides “[t]hose basic and ancillary 
services which enable an individual [with physical disabilities] 
to live in his[/her] home and community rather than in an 
institution and to carry out functions of daily living, self care 
and mobility.” 62 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3052, 3054.  DPW's 
average cost of caring for a person in a nursing home is $45,000 
per year.  The Commonwealth pays 44% of this amount ($19,800) and 
the difference ($24,200) is paid by the federal government.  
DPW’s average cost of caring for a person in the attendant care 
program is $10,500 per year.  That amount is totally borne by the 
Commonwealth.  
 Homemaker Service of the Metropolitan Area, Inc. (“HSMA") 
contracts with DPW to operate an attendant care program.  “The 
[s]ervice [provided by HSMA] consists of those basic and 
ancillary services which enable eligible individuals to live in 
their own homes and communities rather than in institutions and 
to carry out functions of daily living, self-care and mobility.”  
Amended Stipulation of Facts, ¶ 35.  The program thus allows 
eligible individuals: “1. [t]o live in the least restrictive 
environment as independently as possible; 2. [t]o remain in their 
  
homes and to prevent their inappropriate institutionalization. . 
. .” Id. at ¶36.  
 In 1993, HSMA evaluated Idell S. and determined that she was 
eligible for attendant care services.  However, because of a lack 
of funding, she was placed on a waiting list for that program and 
continues living in a nursing home, separated from her children.  
The parties agree that if Idell S. were enrolled in the attendant 
care program, nursing home care would be inappropriate.6  Except 
for access to skilled nursing care which she neither needs nor 
wants, Idell S. receives the same kind of services in the nursing 
home that the attendant care program would provide.  “DPW has not 
applied for reimbursement under the Medical Assistance statute 
for personal care/attendant care services in the community,” 
Amended Stipulation of Facts ¶41, nor has it “requested Medical 
Assistance dollars be available for Attendant Care Services in 
the Community.” Id. at ¶37.  Consequently, the Commonwealth 
continues to spend approximately $45,000 a year to keep Idell S. 
confined in a nursing home rather then spend considerably less to 
provide her with appropriate care in her own home. 
 Because she is required to receive services in a nursing 
home, Idell S. has no contacts with non-disabled persons other 
                     
     
6
 The parties have stipulated that “[t]he setting for the 
provision of attendant care services appropriate to the needs of 
Idell S. is in the community.” Amended Stipulation of Facts ¶29. 
The parties further agree that “[w]ith attendant care services in 
the community, nursing home care would not be appropriate for 
Idell S.” Id., at ¶32. 
  
than the staff of the nursing home and visits from her two 
children. Idell S. claims that this violates Title II of the ADA.  
 III.  
 The standard of review applicable to a grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & 
Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1297 (3d Cir. 1993).  "On review, the 
appellate court is required to apply the same test the district 
court should have utilized initially."  Goodman v. Mead Johnson & 
Co., 535 F.2d 566, 573 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1038 (1977).   A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if 
the court determines "that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  The district court's 
interpretation of a federal regulation is a question of law 
subject to plenary review.  ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1191 
n. 6 (3d Cir. 1989).     
 The district court ruled that Idell S. was   
 
  [d]enied attendant care services because of a 
lack of funds.  [The record] does not 
demonstrate that [she has] been denied 
funding for attendant care services because 
[she] is disabled.  [Her] failure to show 
that [she] has been excluded from the 
attendant care services program on the basis 
of [her] disability is fatal to [her] claim. 
Memorandum Opinion at 11.  We disagree. 
    
 A.  
  
  In order to appreciate the scope of the ADA and its 
attendant  regulations, it is necessary to examine the 
circumstances leading to its enactment.  Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, was the first broad 
federal statute aimed at eradicating discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities.7  “Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, [is] commonly known as the civil 
rights bill of the disabled.” ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1187.  
Section 504 now reads in relevant part: 
  No otherwise qualified individual with a 
disability...shall, solely by reason of her 
or his disability, be excluded from the 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.... 
 
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1994).8  Section 504's sponsors described 
it as a response to "’previous societal neglect’" and introduced 
                     
     
7
 The law developed under section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act is applicable to Title II of the ADA.  See, Easley v. Snider, 
36 F.3d 297 (3d. Cir. 1994).  See also,  28 C.F.R. § 35.103 
("[T]his part [applying to the ADA] shall not be construed to 
apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 791)").  
     
8
 The general prohibition against disability-based 
discrimination contained in §504 was first proposed in the 92nd 
Congress as an amendment to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.  Although it was ultimately 
enacted by the 93rd Congress as part of a pending Vocational 
Rehabilitation Act, its language was patterned after other civil 
rights statutes. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 n. 13 
(1985).  The language of section 504 is virtually identical to 
that of section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
that bars discrimination based upon race, color or national 
origin in federally-assisted programs.  Consolidated Rail Corp. 
v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 626 (1984).  
  
it to  rectify “the country’s ‘shameful oversights’ which caused 
the handicapped to live among society ‘shunted aside, hidden and 
ignored.’" Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 (1985).   
 On April 26, 1976 then-President Gerald Ford signed 
Executive Order No. 11914, 3 C.F.R. 117 (1977), which authorized 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to coordinate 
enforcement of section 504 and which required the Secretary of 
HEW to promulgate regulations for enforcement.9  Subsequently,  
HEW's section 504 rulemaking and enforcement authority was 
transferred to the Department of Health and Human Services 
(“HHS”).  See 20 U.S.C. § 3508. 
 On November 2, 1980, President Carter signed Executive Order 
No. 12250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72995, entitled "Leadership and 
Coordination of Nondiscrimination Laws".  That Executive Order 
transferred HHS’s coordination and enforcement authority to the 
Attorney General.  Section 1-105 of that Executive Order provided 
                                                                  
 As originally enacted, section 504 referred to a 
"handicapped" individual being discriminated against solely by 
reason of a "handicap".  The change in nomenclature from 
“handicap” to “disability” reflects Congress’ awareness that 
individuals with disabilities find the term “handicapped" 
objectionable.  Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Analysis and Implication of a Second-Generation Civil Rights 
Statute, 26 Harv. C.R. - C.L. L.Rev. 413, 522 n. 7 (1991).   
      
     
9
 The Rehabilitation Act did not mandate that any 
regulations be promulgated. Accordingly the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human 
Services), did not promulgate any regulations to implement that 
Act.  Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404 
n. 4 (1979).  
  
that the HHS guidelines "shall be deemed to have been issued by 
the Attorney General pursuant to this Order and shall continue in 
effect until revoked or modified by the Attorney General."  
Thereafter, the Department of Justice adopted the HHS 
coordination and enforcement regulations and transferred them 
from 45 C.F.R. part 84 to 28 C.F.R. part 41, 46 Fed. Reg. 40686. 
(the “coordination regulations.")  The section 504 coordination 
regulations begin by stating that the purpose of 28 C.F.R. part 
41 is to “implement Executive Order 12250, which requires the 
Department of Justice to coordinate the implementation of section 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973." 28 C.F.R. § 41.1.  A 
subsequent section requires all federal agencies to issue 
regulations “to implement section 504 with respect to programs 
and activities to which it provides assistance."  28 C.F.R. § 
41.4.  The coordination regulations contain a separate section 
which lists a number of general prohibitions against disability-
based discrimination.  28 C.F.R. § 41.51.  That section mandates 
that all recipients of federal financial assistance “shall 
administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting 
appropriate to the needs of qualified handicapped persons."  28 
C.F.R. § 41.51(d).  
 Although Section 504 has been called “the cornerstone of the 
civil rights movement of the mobility-impaired", ADAPT v. 
Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1205 (3d Cir. 1989) (concurring opinion), 
its shortcomings and deficiencies quickly became apparent.  See, 
  
e.g., Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to 
Integration,  64 Temp. L. Rev. 393, 394-408 (1991) (The 
Rehabilitation Act and its regulations have been practically a 
dead letter as a remedy for segregated public services).  One 
commentator has written that the weaknesses of section 504 arise 
from its statutory language,10 the limited extent of its 
coverage, inadequate enforcement mechanisms and erratic judicial 
interpretations.  Burgdorf, The Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights 
Statute, 26 Harv. C.R. - C.L. L. Rev. 413, 431 (1991). 
 Toward the end of the 1980's the United States Senate and 
the House of Representatives both recognized that then current 
laws were "inadequate" to combat "the pervasive problems of 
discrimination that people with disabilities are facing."  S. 
Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1989); H.R. Rep. No. 485 
(II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1990).  The Senate recognized the 
need for "omnibus civil rights legislation" for the disabled. S. 
Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1989).  Similarly, the 
House addressed the need for legislation that “will finally set 
in place the necessary civil rights protections for people with 
disabilities."  H. R. Rep. No. 485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 40 
(1990).  Both branches of Congress concluded: 
  [T]here is a compelling need to provide a 
clear and comprehensive national mandate for 
                     
     
10
 We have also noted that section 504 "is both ambiguous 
and lacking in specifics." Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania 
v.Sykes, 833 F.2d 1113, 1117 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, ___ 
U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1293 (1988). 
  
the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities and for the 
integration of persons with disabilities into 
the economic and social mainstream of 
American life.  Further, there is a need to 
provide clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities. 
 
S. Rep. No. 116, 20; H. R. Rep. No. 485 (II), 50 (emphasis 
added).  It was against this backdrop that the ADA was enacted.11  
 B.  
 Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, incorporates 
the "non-discrimination principles" of section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act12 and extends them to state and local 
governments.  Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Section 202 of Title II provides: 
  [N]o qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be 
excluded from participation in or be denied 
the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be 
subjected to discrimination by any such 
entity.  
 
42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Act directs the Attorney General to 
promulgate regulations necessary to implement Title II.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12134(a).  The Act further commands that those 
regulations “be consistent with this chapter and with the 
coordination regulations under part 41 of title 28, Code of 
                     
     
11
 For a concise history of the ADA’s “tortuous legislative 
journey", see Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 471, 472-475 
(1991). 
     
12
 See 28 C.F.R. § 28.103. 
  
Federal Regulations . . . applicable . . . [under §504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973].” 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b).  Accordingly, 
the regulations that the Department of Justice promulgated under 
Title II are patterned after the section 504 coordination 
regulations.  
 Because Title II was enacted with broad language and 
directed the Department of Justice to promulgate regulations as 
set forth above, the regulations which the Department promulgated 
are entitled to substantial deference.  Blum v. Bacon, 457 U.S. 
132, 141 (1982).  ("[T]he interpretation of [the] agency charged 
with the administration of [this] statute is entitled to 
substantial deference.")  "[C]onsiderable weight should be 
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory 
scheme it is entrusted to administer."  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984).   Unless the regulations are “arbitrary, capricious or 
manifestly contrary to the statute", the agency's regulations are 
“given controlling weight".  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 
844. 
 Moreover, because Congress mandated that the ADA regulations 
be patterned after the section 504 coordination regulations, the 
former regulations have the force of law.  When Congress re-
enacts a statute and voices its approval of an administrative 
interpretation of that statute, that interpretation acquires the 
force of law and courts are bound by the regulation.  United 
  
States v. Board of Comm'rs of Sheffield, Alabama, 435 U.S. 110, 
134 (1978).  The same is true when Congress agrees with an 
administrative interpretation of a statute which Congress is re-
enacting.  See Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner, 429 U.S. 569, 
574-577 (1977).  Although Title II of the ADA is not a re-
enactment of section 504, it does extend section 504's anti-
discrimination principles to public entities.  Furthermore, the 
legislative history of the ADA shows that Congress agreed with 
the coordination regulations promulgated under section 504.  See, 
e.g., S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1989) ("The 
first purpose of [Title II] is to make applicable the prohibition 
against discrimination on the basis of disability, currently set 
out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, to. . . state and local governments. . . . ");  H.R. 
Rep. No. 485 (III), 101st Cong., 2d. Sess. 50.  ("The general 
prohibitions set forth in the section 504 regulations are 
applicable to all programs and activities in Title II"). 
  Idell S.’s challenge to DPW’s treatment of her is based 
upon 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).  That ADA regulation states that: “A 
public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities 
in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of 
qualified individuals with disabilities.”  This regulation is 
almost identical to the section 504 integration regulation which 
has been in effect since 1981.  See 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) 
  
(1981).13  As Congress has voiced its approval of that 
coordination regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 130.35(d) has the force of 
law.  
 
 C. 
 
 In enacting the ADA, Congress found that "[h]istorically, 
society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with 
disabilities, and...such forms of discrimination...continue to be 
a serious and pervasive social problem."  42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) 
(emphasis added).  Congress also concluded that “[i]ndividuals 
with disabilities continually encounter various forms of 
discrimination, including. . . segregation. . . .", 42 U.S.C. 
§12101(a)(5) (emphasis added).  The House Report on the ADA noted 
that: "Unlike the other titles in this Act, title II does not 
list all of the forms of discrimination that the title is 
intended to prohibit.  Therefore, the purpose of [section 204] is 
to direct the Attorney General to issue regulations setting forth 
the forms of discrimination prohibited."  H.R. Rep. No. 485 
(III), 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 52 (1990) (emphasis added). 
 In furtherance of the objective of eliminating 
discrimination against the disabled, Congress stated that “the 
Nation’s proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are 
                     
     
13
 The section 504 integration regulation had been in effect 
for 8 years when, in 1989,  the 101st Congress began holding 
hearings on the proposed ADA.  
  
to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, 
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such 
individuals[.]” 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(8) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in response to its mandate, the Department of Justice 
stated “[i]ntegration is fundamental to the purposes of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act.” 28 C.F.R. Part 35, App. A. § 
35.130.14  Accordingly, the integration mandate of § 35.130(d) is 
contained under 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 which is entitled “[g]eneral 
prohibitions against discrimination.”  
 Thus, the ADA and its attendant regulations clearly define 
unnecessary segregation as a form of illegal discrimination 
against the disabled.15 Accordingly, the district court erred in 
holding that the applicable provisions of the ADA “may not be 
                     
     
14We note that this is consistent with the Fair Housing Act 
of 1988, 52 U.S.C. §3604(f), another predecessor of the ADA.  In 
enacting that act, the House Judiciary Committee stated "[t]he 
Fair Housing Amendments Act, like Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, is a clear pronouncement 
of a national commitment to end the unnecessary exclusion of 
persons with handicaps from the American mainstream." H. Rep. No. 
711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 18 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). 
     
15Even if it could be argued that the Act and its 
regulations are ambiguous on this point, the heading of the 
regulation at issue here, and the legislative history of the ADA 
confirm that Congress intended to define unnecessary segregation 
of the disabled as a form of illegal discrimination.  See Crandon 
v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (Where there is 
ambiguity "[i]n determining the meaning of [a] statute, we look 
not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design 
of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy."); See 
also INS v. Center for Immigrants' Rights,         U.S.        . 
112 S. Ct. 551, 556 (1991) (the title of a regulation or section 
is relevant to its interpretation). 
  
invoked unless there is first a finding of discrimination." 
Memorandum Opinion at 12.   
 D. 
 In reaching its conclusion, the district court relied in 
large part upon  Williams v. Secretary of the Executive Office of 
Human Services, 609 N.E.2d 447 (Ma. 1993).16 In Williams, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the ADA does 
not require a specific proportion of that state’s mental health 
service placements to be in integrated housing.  The court 
stated:  
     The focus of Federal disability 
discrimination statutes is to address 
discrimination in relation to nondisabled 
persons, rather than to eliminate all 
differences in levels or proportions of 
resources allocated and services provided to 
individuals with differing types of 
disabilities.  In other words, the purpose of 
the ADA is to provide an equal opportunity 
for disabled citizens. 
 
Williams, 609 N.E.2d at 559. (citations omitted).     
 We are not persuaded by the analysis in  Williams.  That 
court based its decision in part upon our own decision in Clark 
v. Cohen 794 F.2d 79 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 962 
                     
      
16
 The district court also cited Pinnock v. 
International House of Pancakes, 844 F.Supp. 574, 582-3 (S.D. Ca. 
1993), to support its ruling that 28 C.F.R. § 130(d) is not 
applicable unless there is a specific finding of discrimination. 
Id. at 12. However, Pinnock concerned an action under Title III 
of the ADA (public accommodations) and the discussion cited in 
the district court's opinion dealt with the Title III integration 
regulation which the Pinnock court held is "intended to prevent 
segregation based on fears and stereotypes about persons with 
disabilities." Id. Idell S.'s suit does not implicate Title III. 
  
(1986) and the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Choate, 
supra.  Our holding in Clark is not based upon the ADA nor 
section 504, but upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  There, a forty-five year old, mentally retarded woman 
had been committed to a state-run mental institution since she 
was fifteen years old.  She filed a complaint against the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the County of Philadelphia 
alleging various Constitutional violations as well as a violation 
of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  She alleged that her 
confinement was illegal and sought placement in a community-
living arrangement supervised by the County of Philadelphia.  
Clark based her Rehabilitation Act claim upon the fact that the 
Commonwealth was providing community living arrangements to 
persons with disabilities similar to hers while requiring her to 
remain in an institution.  
 The district court ruled that Clark had not established 
disability-based discrimination, but ruled that her confinement 
was unconstitutional.17 619 F. Supp. at 696-705.   In affirming 
the district court’s judgment we stated “[s]ection 504 prohibits 
discrimination against the handicapped in federally funded 
programs[,] [i]t imposes no affirmative obligations on the states 
to furnish services." Clark v. Cohen, 794 F. 2d at 85, n.3.  
However, we were not there concerned with the integration mandate 
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 Clark had been continuously confined even though the 
responsible professionals at the institution admitted that her 
condition did not warrant confinement, and her case had never 
been reviewed by anyone with authority to release her.  
  
of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.  Plaintiff in Clark relied 
primarily upon section 504 and 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.4(b)(1)(i)-(iv). 
The prohibitions contained in the later regulations are under a 
regulation which states "Discriminatory actions prohibited." 45 
U.S.C. § 84.4(b).  That regulation does not state that the 
actions set forth are prohibited per se.  Rather, it states that 
recipients of federal funds may not engage in the enumerated acts 
"on the basis of handicap."  45 U.S.C §84.4(b)(1).  Thus, the 
section 504 inquiry in Clark had to include a determination of 
the basis for the allegedly discriminatory actions.  The language 
of 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) is very different.  
 In addition, we note that the court in Williams was troubled 
by difficulties of proof that are not present here.  The 
plaintiffs in Williams had attempted to use a statistical 
analysis to establish that disabled persons were more likely to 
be adversely affected by the state’s policy than non-disabled 
persons.  The court rejected that proof stating:  
 
  The plaintiffs’ use of a system-wide 
percentage of DMH clients . . . ignores the 
fact that the ADA does not mandate particular 
system-wide percentages for allocations of 
community placements.  Further, the 
plaintiffs’ figures did not show that any 
particular client’s placement was 
inappropriate, or that they themselves were 
inappropriately placed in a segregated 
setting. . . A mere percentage, standing 
alone, does not establish a presumption of 
inappropriate placement. 
 
  
Id., at 414 Mass. 551, 557-8, 609 N.E.2d. 447, 453.  We encounter 
no such problem as the parties have stipulated that Idell S.’s 
placement would be inappropriate if there was an opening in the 
attendant care program.18 
 The court in Williams was also troubled by pragmatic 
concerns of granting relief.  The court stated that "any 
interpretation of the ADA must consider the same practicalities 
that the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in its 
examination of the Federal Rehabilitation Act.  See, e.g. 
Alexander v. Choate, . . . ". Id. at 557, 453 (citations 
omitted).  Choate did not involve 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).  The 
claim there was based upon plaintiffs’ assertion that Tennessee’s 
planned cutbacks in Medicaid reimbursement for in-patient 
hospital stays would disproportionately disadvantage handicapped 
persons in violation of section 504.  However, to the extent that 
Choate is relevant to our analysis, it supports our holding that 
Congress did not intend to condition the protection of the ADA 
upon a finding of “discrimination”.   
 In Choate, the Supreme Court emphasized the factors which 
led to enactment of section 504.  
Discrimination against the handicapped was 
perceived by Congress to be most often the 
product, not of invidious animus, but rather 
of thoughtfulness and indifference -- of 
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 The precise question raised by Idell S. has not 
previously been decided by an appellate court.  Similarly, the 
cases from other circuits that DPW relies upon to support its 
assertion that neither §504 nor Title II of the ADA require 
community care were not decided on the basis of 28 C.F.R. § 
35.130(d).  Brief of Appellee, at 10-11.     
  
benign neglect. Thus, Representative Vanik, 
introducing the predecessor to § 504 in the 
House described the treatment of the 
handicapped as one of the country’s ‘shameful 
oversights’ which caused the handicapped to 
live among society ‘shunted aside, hidden, 
and ignored.’ Similarly, Senator Humphrey . . 
. asserted that, ‘we can no longer tolerate 
the invisibility of the handicapped in 
America. . . .’ And Senator Cranston . . . 
described the Act as a response to ‘previous 
societal neglect’ . . . Federal agencies and 
commentators on the plight of the handicapped 
similarly have found that discrimination 
against the handicapped is primarily the 
result of apathetic attitudes rather than 
affirmative animus. 
 
469 U.S. at 295 (emphasis added) (citations and footnotes 
omitted).19  
 Because the ADA evolved from an attempt to remedy the 
effects of “benign neglect” resulting from the “invisibility” of 
the disabled, Congress could not have intended to limit the Act’s 
protections and prohibitions to circumstances involving 
deliberate discrimination. Such discrimination arises from 
“affirmative animus” which was not the focus of the ADA or 
section 504.  The Supreme court elaborates upon this distinction 
noting that, although discrimination against the disabled 
normally results from “thoughtfulness” and “indifference”, not 
“invidious animus”, such “animus” did exist.  469 U.S. at 295 at 
n.12.  (“To be sure, well-cataloged instances of invidious 
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 The court ruled that the challenged cutbacks were neutral 
on their face and that, therefore, plaintiffs could not recover. 
However, the court noted that a plaintiff need not establish that 
there has been an intent to discriminate in order to prevail 
under section 504. 469 U.S. at 295-297.    
  
discrimination against the handicapped do exist”).   However, 
that was not the focus of section 504, or the ADA.  Rather, the 
ADA attempts to eliminate the effects of that “benign neglect," 
“apathy," and “indifference."  The 504 coordination regulations, 
and the ADA “make clear that the unnecessary segregation of 
individuals with disabilities in the provision of public services 
is itself a form of discrimination within the meaning of those 
statutes, independent of the discrimination that arises when 
individuals with disabilities receive different services than 
those provided to individuals without disabilities.”  Brief of 
Amicus at 7.  
 The ADA is intended to insure that qualified individuals 
receive services in a manner consistent with basic human dignity 
rather than a manner which shunts them aside, hides, and ignores 
them.20  “[M]uch of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in 
passing the Rehabilitation Act [and the ADA] would be difficult 
if not impossible to reach were the Act[s] construed to proscribe 
only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.”  Alexander v. 
Choate, 469 U.S. at 296-7.  Thus, we will not eviscerate the ADA 
by conditioning its protections upon a finding of intentional or 
overt “discrimination.”  
 
                     
     
20However, as discussed infra, the Act does not require 
fundamental changes in the nature of a service or program. 
  
 IV. 
 DPW quotes Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988) to 
argue that there can be no improper discrimination here because 
the services at issue are only provided to persons with 
disabilities.  See Brief of Appellee at 25-6.  However, Traynor 
is easily distinguished.  Traynor concerned the legality of 38 
U.S.C.A. § 1662 which allowed for an extension of time to use 
veteran’s benefits if a disability precluded the veteran from 
using the benefits within the time frame established by law. 
However, the veteran only qualified if he/she could establish “a 
physical or mental disorder which was not the result of [his/her] 
own willful misconduct.”  Id. at 535.  Traynor was an honorably 
discharged veteran who suffered from alcoholism unrelated to any 
psychiatric disorder. Under applicable V.A. regulations, such 
alcoholism  was defined as “willful misconduct” thus precluding 
him from relying upon his “disorder” to enlarge the period of 
time that he could use his benefits.  Traynor challenged this 
limitation on behalf of himself, and other similarly situated 
veterans.  
 In denying the claim, the court noted that section 504 had 
been part of the amendments to the Rehabilitation Act which were 
passed in 1978 and which extended the scope of that legislation 
to “any program or activity conducted by any Executive Agency.” 
Id. at 547.  The court noted that 
petitioners can prevail under the Rehab- 
ilitation Act claim only if the 1978 
legislation can be deemed to have implicitly 
  
repealed the willful misconduct provision of 
the 1977 legislation or forbade the Veterans’ 
Administration to classify primary alcoholism 
as willful misconduct. They must thereby 
overcome the cardinal rule. . . that repeals 
by implication are not favored. 
 
Id. (citations and internal quotes omitted).  The court reasoned 
that it was not at liberty to assume that the subsequent 
enactment of the Rehabilitation Act implicitly repealed the prior 
act unless “such a construction is absolutely necessary . . . in 
order that [the] words [of the latter statute] shall have any 
meaning at all.”  Id. (brackets in original).  These two 
enactments were “capable of co-existence” as the “willful 
misconduct” provision did not undermine the central purpose of 
section 504.  That purpose was to “assure that handicapped 
individuals receive ‘evenhanded treatment’ in relation to 
nonhandicapped individuals.”  Id. at 548 (citing Alexander v. 
Choate).  
 The court then noted that the program at issue did not treat 
handicapped persons less favorably than nonhandicapped persons as 
only handicapped persons could apply for an extension of time.  
“In other words § 1662(a)(1) merely provides a special benefit to 
disabled veterans who bear no responsibility for their 
disabilities that is not provided to other disabled veterans or 
to any able-bodied veterans.”  Id.  The court then stated 
“[t]here is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that requires that 
any benefit extended to one category of handicapped persons also 
be extended to all other categories of handicapped persons.”  Id. 
  
However, the court was not concerned with the application of the 
integration mandate, or anything analogous to it, and the holding 
is not germane to our analysis. As noted above, Congress has 
stated that “discrimination against individuals with disabilities 
persists in such critical areas as . . . institutionalization.” 
42 U.S.C. §12101 (3).  If Congress were only concerned about 
disparate treatment of the disabled as compared to their 
nondisabled counterparts, this statement would be a non sequitur 
as only disabled persons are institutionalized.  
 DPW also relies upon Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 
1494 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1255 (1993). 
("[W]here the handicapping condition is related to the 
condition(s) being treated, it will rarely, if ever, be possible 
to say. . . that a particular decision was ‘discriminatory’") 
(citation omitted)).  See Brief of Appellee at 7.  Johnson is 
also inapposite.  There, the court was asked to hold that 
different levels of medical treatment given to differently 
classified infants affected with spina bifida violated section 
504.  The case did not involve any claim that the integration 
mandate of 504 or the ADA had been violated.21  
 DPW also attempts to defeat Idell S.’s claim by labelling it 
a claim for “community care” or “deinstitutionalization” -- 
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 See Martin v. Voinovich, 840 F. Supp. 1175, 1191-92 (S.D. 
Ohio 1993) (Under §504 and the ADA, discrimination between people 
with different disabilities may be actionable).  
  
something which the ADA does not require.22 See Brief of Appellee 
at 10. Idell S. is not asserting a right to community care or 
deinstitutionalization per se.  She properly concedes that DPW is 
under no obligation to provide her with any care at all.  She is 
merely claiming that, since she qualifies for DPW’s attendant 
care program, DPW’s failure to provide those services in the 
“most integrated setting appropriate” to her needs (without a 
proper justification) violates the ADA.   
 V. 
 DPW’s obligation to provide appropriately integrated 
services is not absolute as the ADA does not require that DPW 
make fundamental alterations in its program.  
  A public entity shall make reasonable 
modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures when the modifications are 
necessary to avoid discrimination on the 
basis of disability, unless the public entity 
can demonstrate that making the modifications 
would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
service, program, or activity 
 
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7).  In Southeastern Community College v. 
Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), and Alexander v. Choate, supra, the 
Supreme Court attempted to define the limits of the requirements 
under the ADA.  
 In Southeastern, Southeastern Community College refused to 
admit an  applicant to its nursing school program because of her 
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 See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 
U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (deinstitutionalization involves "massive" 
changes in a state's programs and is not required absent a clear 
statutory command).  
  
hearing impairment.  The college argued that a registered nurse 
had to meet certain physical requirements, and asserted that 
Davis’ disability compromised her ability to effectively 
participate in critical training programs and safely care for 
patients.  Davis countered that section 504 required that the 
school take certain measures to allow her to enjoy the benefits 
of the nursing program.  The Court disagreed and held that 
section 504 imposes no obligation to engage in “affirmative 
action.” Id. at 411.  In Choate, the Court explained that 
“affirmative action” as used in Davis "[r]eferred to those 
‘changes,' ‘adjustments,' or ‘modifications' to existing programs 
that would be ‘substantial' or that would constitute ‘fundamental 
alteration[s]' in the nature of a program . . .,' rather than to 
those changes that would be reasonable accommodations." 
(citations omitted).  Id. at 300 n. 20.   
  In attempting to discern what is required 
by the language of section 504, we must view 
it in light of two countervailing legislative 
concerns:  (1) effectuation of the statute’s 
objectives of assisting the handicapped; and 
(2) the need to impose reasonable boundaries 
in accomplishing this legislative purpose. 
See Alexander v. Choate. 
 
ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d at 1191.  “The test to determine the 
reasonableness of a modification is whether it alters the 
essential nature of the program or imposes an undue burden or 
hardship in light of the overall program.”  Easely v. Snider, 36 
F.3d at 305.   
  
 Here, DPW agrees that “the most integrated setting 
appropriate to [Idell S.]” is her home but argues that it cannot 
comply with Idell S.'s request for the “most integrated services 
appropriate" absent a fundamental alteration of its program.  
Brief of Appellee, at 13-17.  The only explanation DPW has 
offered for this position is its assertion that funding for 
nursing home and attendant care for fiscal year 1993-1994 has 
already been appropriated by the General Assembly of Pennsylvania 
and that it cannot, under state constitutional law, shift funds 
from the nursing care appropriation to attendant care.  Brief of 
Appellee, at 14-15.  However, Idell S. is not asking that DPW 
alter its requirements for admission to the program, nor is she 
requesting that the substance of the program be altered to 
accommodate her.23 Even if we assume that DPW cannot (or will 
not) cause the necessary shift of funds under its current 
procedures and practices, it is clear from this record that 
providing attendant care services to Idell S. in her home would 
not be a fundamental alteration of the attendant care program or 
the nursing home program. 
 As previously noted, DPW administers its attendant care 
program under the Care Act, 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 3052 et seq. 
(1994).  That Act states:  
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 See Easley v. Snider, supra (The ADA does not require 
that the Commonwealth extend its attendant care services to 
physically disabled individuals who were not mentally alert as 
doing so would result in an unreasonable modification of the 
program).  
  
The General Assembly declares it is the 
policy of this Commonwealth that: 
 
   (1) The increased availability of 
attendant care services for adults will 
enable them to live in their own homes and 
communities. 
   (2) Priority recipients of attendant care 
services under this act shall be those 
mentally alert but severely physically 
disabled who are in the greatest risk of 
being in an institutional setting. 
 
 We have previously noted that the attendant care program 
enables physically disabled persons to 
"better control their lives and reach maximum 
independence when they are able to direct 
their own personal care and manage their 
home, business, and social lives.  Attendant 
[c]are in Pennsylvania continues to be seen 
as part of the wider independent living 
movement whose fundamental goals are to 
enable the physically disabled to: a) 
maintain a less restrictive and/or 
independent living arrangement; b) maintain 
employment; and/or c) remain in their homes." 
 
Easley, 36 F.3d at 304.  This is remarkably similar to the policy 
and purpose of the ADA in general, and 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) in 
particular.  We fail to see how compliance with 28 C.F.R. § 
35.130(d) requires DPW to fundamentally alter its attendant care 
program.  Nor do we perceive how the requested moderation would 
place an undue burden on DPW.  On the contrary, the relief that 
Idell S. is requesting merely requires DPW to fulfill its own 
obligations under state law.  This is not “unreasonable."     
As with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act, integrated services are essential to 
accomplishing the purposes of title II [of 
the ADA].  As stated by Judge Mansmann in 
Adapt v. Skinner, the goal [is to] eradicate 
  
the ‘invisibility of the handicapped'" . . . 
[s]eparate-but-equal services do not 
accomplish this central goal and should be 
rejected. 
 
  The fact that it is more convenient, either 
administratively or fiscally, to provide 
services in a segregated manner, does not 
constitute a valid justification for separate 
or different services under Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act, or under [title II of 
the ADA]. 
 
H. R. Rep. 485 (III), 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 50. reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 73, (emphasis added).  
 Ironically, DPW asserts a justification of administrative 
convenience to resist an accommodation which would save an 
average of $34,500 per year, would allow Idell S. to live at home 
with her children, and which would not require a single 
substantive change in its attendant care or nursing home 
programs.  DPW’s resistance to such an accommodation is totally 
inconsistent with Congress’ pronouncement that “[t]he Nation's 
proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to 
assure equality of opportunity, full participation, [and] 
independent living. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).  
 DPW asserts that it cannot change Idell S.'s care because 
the nursing home and attendant care programs are currently funded 
on two separate lines of its budget.24  The General 
Appropriations Act.  Act 1-A of 1993, at 104, 115. DPW asserts 
that  “[u]nder state constitutional law, Secretary Snider cannot 
                     
     
24This, of course, does not explain why DPW has not changed 
her status in a new budget year. 
  
move funds from one line to another.”  See Brief of Appellee at 
14-15 (citing Ashbourne School v. Commonwealth, Department of 
Education, 43 Pa. Com. 593, 403 A.2d 161 (1979).  It is not now 
up to us to invent a funding mechanism whereby the Commonwealth 
can properly finance its nursing home and attendant care 
programs.  However, the ADA applies to the General Assembly of 
Pennsylvania, and not just to DPW. DPW can not rely upon a 
funding mechanism of the General Assembly to justify 
administering its attendant care program in a manner that 
discriminates and then argue that it can not comply with the ADA 
without fundamentally altering its program.  We dismissed a 
similar contention in Delaware Valley Citizen’s Council for Clean 
Air v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 678 F.2d 470 (3rd Cir. 
1982).  There, plaintiff sought to hold certain members of the 
executive branch of state government in contempt for failing to 
comply with a consent decree in which the officials had agreed to 
establish an admissions inspection program. After the consent 
decree had been executed, the General Assembly enacted 
legislation which specifically “prohibited the expenditure of 
state funds by the executive branch for the implementation of 
[that program].  Although the Governor vetoed the bill, the 
legislature overrode the veto and enacted [the legislation] into 
law.” Id. at 473-4.  Thereafter, the Department of Transportation 
“ceased all efforts toward implementing the [program].” Id.  
There, as here, the defendants relied upon Ashbourne, to argue 
  
that their hands were tied by the power of appropriations vested 
in the General Assembly.  We rejected that position.  “These 
arguments disregard the fact that the Commonwealth itself was and 
remains bound by the consent decree.”  Delaware Valley Citizen’s 
Council, 678 F.2d at 475.  We stated: 
Because the Commonwealth, including all its 
branches, is bound by the decree, the 
argument of inability to comply rings hollow. 
Even if the executive branch defendants were 
physically or legally incapable of complying 
with the decree, those Commonwealth officials 
sitting in the General Assembly certainly are 
not incapable of insuring the Commonwealth’s 
compliance.  
 
678 F.2d at 476-6.  The same applies here:  since the 
Commonwealth has chosen to provide services to Idell S. under the 
ADA, it must do so in a manner which comports with the 
requirements of that statute.  
 
  VI. 
 Generally, an appellate court reversing a grant of summary 
judgment will not direct the district court to enter summary 
judgment in favor of appellant because a genuine issue of 
material fact will remain.  First National Bank v. Lincoln 
National Life Insurance Co., 824 F.2d 277, 281 (3d Cir. 1987).  
However, when an appeal concerns only issues of law, we are free 
to enter an order directing the district court to enter summary 
judgment in favor of the appellant.  Kreimer v. Bureau of Police 
for the Town of Morristown, 958 F.2d 1242, 1250 (3d Cir. 1992).    
  
 Here, there are no genuine issues of material fact because 
of the Amended Stipulation entered into by the parties.  The only 
issue that remains is the interpretation and application of the 
ADA and 28 C.F.R. § 130.35(d).  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and remand 
this case to the district court for entry of an order granting 
summary judgment to Idell S. and against DPW.  
 
